A long-standing open question in algorithmic mechanism design is whether there exist computationally efficient truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, with performance guarantees close to those possible without considerations of truthfulness. In this article, we answer this question negatively: the requirement of truthfulness can impact dramatically the ability of a mechanism to achieve a good approximation ratio for combinatorial auctions.
INTRODUCTION
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The subject of this article is one of the fundamental questions of algorithmic mechanism design: is it possible to design computationally efficient truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with the same (or similar) performance guarantees that can be achieved without considerations of truthfulness? In particular, the following is one of the earliest open questions in algorithmic mechanism design [Lehmann et al. 2001 [Lehmann et al. , 2006 : is there a truthful computationally efficient mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders that provides a constant-factor approximation in terms of social welfare?
This problem demonstrates what is perhaps the main theme in algorithmic mechanism design-the clash between truthfulness and computational feasibility: the VCG mechanism (see Nisan [2007] ) is a truthful mechanism but is not computationally feasible; on the other hand, computationally efficient algorithms that provide a good approximation ratio for this problem exist, but these are not truthful. Next, we define this problem more formally and review related work, explain why it resisted previous attempts to solve it, and introduce the new direct hardness technique that enables us to finally prove impossibility results for computationally efficient truthful mechanisms.
Problem Definition and Related Work
Combinatorial auctions. In a combinatorial auction, there is a set M of items (|M| = m) and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + , which is normalized (v i (0) = 0) and nondecreasing. An important case is when each valuation is submodular: for every item j and bundles S and T , S ⊆ T ,
v(S ∪ { j}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ { j}) − v(T ).
The economic interpretation of the definition is that the valuations exhibit "decreasing marginal utilities." The goal is to maximize the social welfare, i.e., to find an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) that maximizes i v i (S i ). As in previous work, we would like our algorithms to run in time polynomial in the natural parameters of the problems, n and m. Since the valuation functions are objects of exponential size (we have to specify a value for each of the 2 m bundles), there are two main approaches in the literature for representing the valuation functions:
-Oracles: Each valuation is given to us as a black box that can only answer specific queries about the valuation functions. In this article, we consider the simple (and the most popular) type of queries, value queries: given S, return the value of v(S). -Succinct representation: Each valuation function v is represented by a string of size that is polynomial in n and m. In addition, we require that given this representation, value queries can be simulated in time polynomial in n and m: for each set S, the value v(S) can be computed in polynomial time. The format of the representation is sometimes called the bidding language.
The problem has received much attention, even from a pure optimization point of view, completely ignoring incentives. Concluding this line of work, Vondrák [2008] provides an algorithm with an approximation ratio of e e−1 , improving over the 2-approximation of the greedy algorithm [Lehmann et al. 2006 ]. This ratio is the best possible with a polynomial number of value queries [Mirrokni et al. 2008] . This is also the best ratio possible for succinctly represented submodular valuations [Khot et al. 2008] , although for some subclasses like budget-additive valuations, algorithms with better approximation ratios exist [Chakrabarty and Goel 2010] .
Although value queries form the traditional model of choice in the design of algorithms for optimization of submodular functions (e.g., see Schrijver [2000] , Iwata et al. [2001] , Feige et al. [2011] , and Cȃlinescu et al. [2011] ), some algorithms for combinatorial auctions guarantee improved approximation ratios using the stronger demand queries (given prices p 1 , . . . , p m , return a bundle that maximizes v(S) − j∈S p j ). The state of the art in this setting is an ( e e−1 − 10 −4 )-approximation algorithm [Feige and Vondrák 2010] , an improvement over the e e−1 -approximation algorithm of Dobzinski and Schapira [2006] , and a 2-approximation for the more general class of subadditive valuations [Feige 2006 ].
Truthful mechanisms. The main interest of this work is in truthful mechanisms that handle the selfish behavior of the bidders. In other words, we seek a mechanism that charges bidders in such a way that reporting the true valuation is the best possible (dominant) strategy for each agent to maximize the value of their bundle minus charged cost. We defer the technical definition until Section 2.
Our knowledge regarding the design of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions is much less clear. The VCG mechanism is a truthful algorithm for the problem, but it requires computing the optimal solution and thus is not computable in polynomial time. The best known polynomial-time deterministic truthful mechanism for submodular valuations provides a poor approximation ratio of O( √ m) [Dobzinski et al. 2010] . Whether this ratio is the best possible is the subject of the current article. If we provide the algorithm designer with more power and allow the use of both randomization and the strictly more powerful demand queries, truthful mechanisms with logarithmic approximation ratios exist [Krysta and Vöcking 2012; Dobzinski 2007; ]. Yet despite all progress made over the years, the algorithmic mechanism design community was unable to answer the question posed by Lehmann et al. [2001] : is there a truthful polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders?
Previous Attempts: The Characterize and Optimize Approach
Roughly speaking, problems in algorithmic mechanism design are either single parameter or multiparameter. Single-parameter problems, where the private information of each player consists of one real number, are quite well understood: an algorithm is truthful if and only if it is monotone (see Nisan [2007] ). This characterization gives rise to many truthful algorithms with approximation ratios that match what is achievable by the best nontruthful polynomial time mechanisms (e.g., Lehmann et al. [2002] , Briest et al. [2005] , and Christodoulou and Kovács [2013] ).
Combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders belong to the harder class of multiparameter problems. In this class, the private information of each player consists of more than one parameter (e.g., in combinatorial auctions, the private information of a bidder consists of exponentially many values of bundles). Since the current best approximation ratios achievable by truthful polynomial-time mechanisms are usually quite far from what can be obtained from a pure algorithmic point of view that ignores incentive issues, great effort has been invested in proving impossibility results. The main obstacle in proving these impossibility results is the hardness of obtaining useful characterizations for multiparameter domains. Specifically, all previously known impossibility results on the power of computationally efficient truthful mechanisms-not just for combinatorial auctions-are proved using the following two-stage paradigm:
(1) Characterize all truthful mechanisms for the setting, ignoring computational issues.
(2) Optimize over all truthful algorithms, i.e., show a lower bound on the approximation ratio of the best computationally efficient mechanism characterized in the previous step.
This paradigm was quite successful in obtaining impossibility results for problems with "full dimensionality" [Lavi et al. 2003; Dobzinski and Sundararajan 2008; Papadimitriou et al. 2008] : in the first "characterization step," it is shown that all (deterministic) truthful mechanisms for the problems are VCG-based (a slight generalization of the VCG mechanism), regardless of their approximation ratio-thereby extending Roberts' theorem [Roberts 1979 ].
1 The second "optimization step" shows that VCG-based algorithms cannot provide a good approximation ratio in polynomial time.
For combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations, the optimization step was accomplished in Dobzinski and Nisan [2011a] , where it was shown that every VCGbased m 1 6 -approximation mechanism requires exponential communication. In addition, for combinatorial auctions with explicit submodular valuations such as budget-additive ones, it was shown that there is no VCG-based mechanism with approximation ratio m η , η < 1/2 unless N P ⊆ P/ poly [Buchfuhrer et al. 2010a] . However, completing the characterization step is notoriously hard for auction domains and, in general, domains that do not exhibit externalities: in these domains, there are truthful mechanisms that are not VCG based. For example, for multiunit auctions [Dobzinski and Nisan 2011b] , there are deterministic non-VCG-based mechanisms that guarantee arbitrarily good approximation ratios.
2 Until now, Dobzinski and Nisan [2011b] has been the only example of a successful characterization of truthful mechanisms for a multiparameter auction domain, and even there the characterization is only for deterministic mechanisms under an extra assumption of scalability, for two bidders. Although this suffices for obtaining an optimal inapproximability result for multiunit auctions, an optimal result for combinatorial auctions probably requires characterization of mechanisms for many bidders. This task seems to be quite difficult: we do not even have a good conjecture of what the class of mechanisms with good approximation ratios might be. The problem is even more acute for randomized mechanisms: The best currently known randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular/subadditive bidders is not VCG based [Dobzinski 2007] , and the characterization of truthful randomized mechanisms seems to be beyond the reach of current techniques.
Our Results: Impossibility via Direct Hardness
This article introduces a simple technique for bounding the power of truthful mechanisms. We show how to apply this technique both in the value oracle case and for succinctly described valuation functions. The technique is very different from the characterize-and-optimize approach, and in particular, it does not require obtaining characterizations of truthful mechanisms at all. The starting point is the well-known taxation principle: consider some player i and fix the valuations of all other players. According to the taxation principle, a truthful algorithm assigns to each bundle S a price p S (possibly ∞), and bidder i gets the bundle that maximizes his profit v(S) − p S . We call this set of bundles and prices the menu of player i. We show that in any algorithm that provides a good approximation, there exist valuations such that some bidder faces a "large" menu with a "nice" structure. We then prove that selecting the profit maximizing bundle in the menu-a must according to the taxation principle-is a computationally difficult task.
3 This leads us to the statement of our first result.
THEOREM. Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders using value queries that provides an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − , for some constant > 0. Then, A makes exponentially many value queries. Notice that our result holds not only for deterministic mechanisms but also for universally truthful mechanisms (i.e., a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms). This is yet another benefit of skipping the characterization step and using our direct hardness approach.
We prove an analogous result for the succinct representation case in the following theorem.
THEOREM. There is a class C of succinctly represented monotone submodular valuations such that if there is a universally truthful polynomial-time mechanism for combinatorial auctions with valuations in C that guarantees an approximation ratio of m 1/2− , for any fixed > 0, then NP = RP.
The proof of this theorem is obtained by converting the proof for the value oracle model into computational hardness proofs in the following manner. In the oracle-based proof, there is a certain "hidden set" that is hard to find by value queries-the profit maximizing bundle. Obviously, for succinctly represented valuations, we cannot just specify the hidden set on the input, as the set will no longer be "hidden." Instead, the hidden set is represented implicitly as a solution to some computationally difficult problem (e.g., SAT). However, various difficulties arise when trying to incorporate this representation in the proof of hardness for truthful mechanisms. Let us describe one of them. In the value oracle case, the construction of the valuation function itself depends on the properties of the presumed mechanism, namely on its pricing scheme. We resolve this issue by incorporating a component in the representation of a valuation that allows us to feed a description of the presumed mechanism itself into the valuation, thus obtaining a contradiction by an argument similar to diagonalization.
An interesting feature of this proof is that it does not rely on the Sauer-Shelah lemma or VC-dimension, which played an important role in previous computational hardness results for VCG-based mechanisms for combinatorial public projects and combinatorial auctions [Papadimitriou et al. 2008; Buchfuhrer et al. 2010a Buchfuhrer et al. , 2010b . Rather, we design the representation of a valuation function in a way that allows the embedding of a computationally hard problem and yet admits efficient evaluation of the function.
Subsequent Work and This Article
In Dobzinski [2011] , the main result was the inapproximability result for truthful combinatorial auctions with value oracles. This result is given in the current article. In addition, Dobzinski [2011] contained two other applications of the direct hardness approach: optimal hardness results for flexible combinatorial public projects and for exact truthful-in-expectation combinatorial public projects. The last two results are omitted from the current article.
Subsequent to this work, Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] used the direct hardness approach in combination with the "symmetry gap" technique for submodular functions to significantly strengthen these results by providing impossibility results for 5:6 S. Dobzinski and J. Vondrák truthful-in-expectation combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders in the value oracle model, as well as truthful-in-expectation flexible combinatorial public projects (albeit with a slightly weaker hardness factor). Our follow-up work [Dobzinski and Vondrák 2012] provides the first computational hardness results for combinatorial auctions with succinctly represented valuations, both for universally truthful combinatorial auctions and for truthful-in-expectation combinatorial auctions. For ease of exposition, we limit ourselves to universally truthful mechanisms in this article. In summary, this work combines two conference papers: Dobzinski [2011] and the first part of Dobzinski and Vondrák [2012] .
Open Questions
This article provides optimal inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders when the valuations are represented by value oracles and for succinctly represented valuations. This was achieved by introducing a novel approach that allows proving hardness without characterization. Nevertheless, a full characterization of truthful mechanisms with a good approximation ratio remains an important question, even ignoring computational implications.
If demand queries are allowed, there exists a randomized universally truthful O(log m)-approximation algorithm [Krysta and Vöcking 2012; Dobzinski 2007] . Is there a better than √ m-approximation deterministic mechanism that uses a polynomial number of demand queries? Is there a truthful-in-expectation O(1)-approximation mechanism that uses demand queries, 4 or even a universally truthful one? The succinct representation case offers several very interesting open questions as well. First, answering demand queries in the bidding languages used in our proof is NP-hard. Can one prove an analogous hardness result for bidding languages in which demand queries can be answered efficiently? This seems to be a challenging question that requires substantial extensions of our techniques. For example, with demand queries, it is possible to achieve a logarithmic approximation via a universally truthful mechanism [Dobzinski 2007 ], which beats the bounds that we give. Another question is to prove impossibility results for specific bidding languages, like budget additive, coverage, and XOS. These questions remain open, but we do believe that a refinement of our direct-hardness technique might be capable of making significant progress in providing answers.
Article organization. Section 2 is the Preliminaries section. Section 3 contains our main results: the impossibility of truthful polynomial-time combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations.
PRELIMINARIES
In a combinatorial auction, there is a set M of heterogeneous items (|M| = m) and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + , which is normalized (v i (∅) = 0) and nondecreasing (v i (S) ≤ v i (T ) whenever S ⊂ T ). In this article, we assume that the valuations are submodular: a valuation v is submodular if it exhibits decreasing marginal utilities,
every two bundles S and T . A special case of submodular valuations is additive valuations: a valuation is additive if for every bundle S, v(S) = j∈S v({ j}).
Let V be the set of all submodular valuations. An allocation of the items is an n-tuple S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of pairwise disjoint of subsets of M. Let S be the set of all allocations. The goal is to find an allocation that maximizes the social welfare:
We consider two different ways of representing and accessing the valuation functions:
-The valuations are given as black boxes. We assume that the black box v is accessed only via value queries: given a bundle S, return v(S). We want our algorithms to make a polynomial number (in n and m) of value queries to the black boxes. -Each valuation function v i is succinctly represented, i.e., the representation size is polynomial in n and m. For each set S, the value v i (S) can be computed in time that is polynomial in m.
Truthfulness. The reader is referred to Nisan [2007] for the (standard) proofs missing in this section. An n-bidder mechanism is a pair (A, p), where A :
It is well known that a deterministic mechanism is truthful if and only if each bidder is presented with a payment p
, and each bidder is allocated a bundle that maximizes
T (v −i ) over all T possibly allocated to bidder i. This is called the taxation principle-we will sometimes say that these payments are induced by v −i . (See Section 9.5.1 in Nisan [2007] for more details.)
We can assume that p
T (v −i ) for S ⊂ T , the mechanism can never allocate S to player i under the remaining valuations v −i . We can set p
T (v −i ), and we do not affect the truthfulness of the mechanism. This process can be repeated until p
Definition 2.2 (Menu). Fix a deterministic mechanism (A, p) and the valuations v
Observe that shifting all prices in the menu by the same constant does not affect truthfulness, since the set of profit-maximizing bundles of each bidder remains the same. Therefore, fixing the other bidders' valuations, we normalize the price of the bundle that bidder i gets when his valuation is identically 0 to be zero. We can also assume that empty bundle has price 0; if not, it means that the empty bundle has a nonnegative price and we can change it to 0 without affecting truthfulness. Definition 2.3. A randomized mechanism (A, p) is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms.
In other words, a universally truthful mechanism is truthful for any fixed choice of its random coins. The randomization typically plays a role in the analysis of its approximation ratio. We assume that an efficient universally truthful mechanism runs in polynomial time and makes a polynomial number of queries for each choice of its random coins. 
Chernoff Bounds
We will use the following version of Chernoff bounds (see Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in Motwani and Raghavan [1996] 
THE MAIN RESULTS
We prove two theorems that bound the power of universally truthful mechanisms. In particular, for any constant > 0 and n = m 1/2− , we get that A must make an exponential number of value queries to achieve an approximation ratio better than (m 1/2− ). Theorem 3.2 considers the case where the valuation functions are succinctly represented. Both proofs share the same general structure. They aim to show that for some v i and some valuations of the other bidders v −i , finding the bundle that maximizes the profit of bidder i v i (S) − p v −i (S) either requires an exponential number of value queries or implies that we can solve some NP-hard problem. The proof is divided into two parts. The first part (Section 3.3) is identical in both proofs. In it, we show that there are valuations v −i that induce a submenu with "nice" properties. In the second part, we use the submenu to define a valuation v i of bidder i such that finding the profit-maximizing bundle for v i requires an exponential number of value queries (Section 3.4) or imply that we can find the solution to a given SAT formula (Section 3.6).
Specifically, the first step shows that for some v −i , the menu of bidder i is exponentially large. This by itself is not enough; the profit-maximizing bundle may sometimes be easily found even in exponentially large menus. Therefore, we find a "large" submenu where the bundles' prices are "almost the same" with the additional property that if a bundle T is in the submenu, then every other bundle U in the menu that contains T has a "significantly" higher price. These two properties, together with other easier-to-show properties, enable us to construct a valuation v i for which finding the profit-maximizing bundle is computationally hard.
Basic Setup
First, let us define the basic concepts that we use in the proof and then prove a few useful properties. 
For a structured submenu S, we call S a candidate if S ∈ S.
We will use the probabilistic method to prove that in random instances with polar additive valuations, a bidder must sometimes have an exponentially large structured submenu. These random instances are constructed as follows. . We call valuations constructed this way random polar additive valuations. We say that item j is demanded by bidder i if v i ({ j}) = 1. In a basic random instance, each bidder has an independently random polar additive valuation. 
PROOF. The first property holds, as otherwise bidder i with valuation v i (v i (M) ≤ m) has negative profit for S and thus prefers the empty bundle (which has a profit of zero). The second property holds since the marginal value of every item in a polar additive valuation is at least 1 m 3 . Thus, if the price difference between S and T is less than 1 m 3 , then T is preferable to S and S / ∈ S v −i .
The next claim shows that with high probability the value of the optimal solution is high. PROOF. Fix some item j. The probability that this item is demanded by at least one bidder is 1 − (1 − 1/n) n ≥ 1 − 1/e. Thus, the number of items demanded by at least one bidder is at least as large as a sum of m independent Bernoulli variables, with expectation p = 1 − 1/e. By the Chernoff bound, with = 1/5 (using (1− 1/5)(1 − 1/e) > 1/2), PROOF. The probability that item j ∈ S is demanded by bidder i is 1/n. By the Chernoff bounds, the probability that more than 2|S| n of the items in S will be demanded by bidder i is at most e −|S|/3n . The contribution of items that are not demanded by i is at most m·
m 2 with probability at least 1 − e −|S|/3n .
Reduction to Deterministic Mechanisms
Next, we deal with the issue of possible randomization by a mechanism. Recall that a universally truthful mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. In the following, we identify the existence of a particular deterministic mechanism that we will work with in the following. PROOF. Let A denote the probability distribution over mechanisms that constitutes A, and let I denote the probability distribution of random polar additive instances.
For a (deterministic) mechanism A and input I, let O(A , I) denote the event that
A provides an n 10 -approximation on I. Further, denote by O * (A ) the property that
Assume for a contradiction that Pr
. By the law of conditional probabilities,
This means that a random mechanism A ∼ A on a random instance I ∼ A provides an n 10 -approximation with probability at most 2 n . By an averaging argument, there exists a fixed instance I on which a random mechanism A gives n 10 -approximation with probability at most OPT on this instance. This is a contradiction to the assumed approximation ratio of A.
Finding Exponentially Large Structured Submenus
LEMMA 3.11. Let A be a deterministic mechanism that provides a n 10 -approximation for a random polar additive instance with probability at least 10n 2 ·m 7 , with probability at least 1 10n 2 over the random polar additive instances. The heart of the proof is the following claim. We consider a random polar additive instance and show that with polynomially high probability, there exists a bidder facing an exponentially large menu. holds, we bound the probability trivially by 1. Therefore, we obtain
Toward a contradiction, assume that Pr[B i ] ≤ 1 10n 2 for all i. By the union bound over all i, and including the events O and P whose probabilities we bounded above, 
where we use the fact that all events C 
The final inequality holds since m ≥ n 2 by assumption. Thus, the value returned by the mechanism on this instance is less than 5m n . However, since event O occurs in this instance, the optimum value is at least m/2 on this instance. Since event P also occurs, the approximation ratio should be at least n 10 , and hence the value returned by the mechanism on this instance should be at least 5m n . This is a contradiction.
Given this claim, it is easy to finish the proof of Lemma 3.11. Whenever the conclusion of the last claim holds, we can define a structured submenu with the required size as follows. Take S v −i of size at least e m/3n 2 10n 2 , as guaranteed by the claim. Put the bundle 
, since all bundles of size k have value at least (k − 1 2 )t. On the other hand, v 
Next, we show that when bidder i's valuation is v S * i and the other bidders' valuations are v −i , S * is his profit maximizing bundle. It is obvious that by choosing a large enough value of t a bundle of size at least k will maximize the profit, but a priori it is unclear that the profit maximizing bundle will be S * . The following claims use the properties of a structured menu and the particular structure of v S * i to show that S * will maximize the profit and not some other bundle.
PROOF. Since prices are nonnegative, it suffices to show that
The claim now follows since t = 2m · 2 m , and by the properties of a structured submenu,
, for every bundle S such that |S| > k where there exists some T ∈ S such that T ⊆ S.
PROOF. Observe that for S as described in the claim, v
. By the properties of a structured submenu, since S contains some set T ∈ S, we have that
By the previous claims, we are left with the case where v
This implies that bidder i must be allocated the bundle S * . However, we show that finding S * cannot be done efficiently:
CLAIM 3.18. Finding S * requires |S|−1 value queries for any deterministic mechanism.
PROOF. Consider a deterministic mechanism that makes at most |S| − 2 value queries, executed on a valuation v and v −i for the remaining players. Clearly, the mechanism cannot query all v i (S) for all S ∈ S; there are at least two bundles S 1 , S 2 ∈ S that are not queried by the mechanism on this input. Now suppose that we replace the valuation of player i by either v
Since the values of sets apart from S 1 , S 2 have not been changed, the mechanism will follow the same computation path as if the valuation were v ∅ i , and it will allocate the same bundle to player i. However, in these two cases, the most profitable bundle for player i is S 1 or S 2 , respectively, so at least in one instance the mechanism does not return the profit-maximizing bundle for player i.
Wrapping Up the Proof of Theorem 3.1
We now show how to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1. Consider a universally truthful mechanism A that provides an approximation ratio of n 12
. By Lemma 3.10, there exists a deterministic mechanism A that provides an n 10 -approximation with probability at least 1 n on random polar additive instances. Lemma 3.11 guarantees that there exist valuations v −i and bidder i facing a structured submenu of size at least e m/n 2 10n 2 ·m 6 . (The exact probability of this event is not needed in this section-existence is enough to derive the result.) Now we use Lemma 3.13 to conclude that there exists a valuation v S * i such that finding the profit maximizing bundle S * -a must for every truthful algorithm, see Section 2-takes at least e m/n 2 10n 2 ·m 6 value queries. Hence, we get that A makes exponentially many value queries, with some positive probability. 
The Optimization Lemma for Succinctly Represented Valuations

variables.
A word is in order regarding the differences between the proof of this lemma and the proof of the analogous lemma for value oracles (Lemma 3.13). Lemma 3.13 constructs a generic family of valuations using the properties of the structured menu induced by v −i and choosing a specific valuation by giving a bonus to one particular bundle (the intended profit maximizing bundle). However, here we work with succinctly described valuations, i.e., each valuation should have a polynomial-size description that allows one to evaluate the value of every bundle efficiently. This causes an extra layer of complication: not only does the structured menu depend on the truthful mechanism itself and the valuations of the other players, but we cannot even explicitly describe it since it is exponentially large. To overcome this obstacle, we use a "diagonalization argument": we allow as part of a valuation v M to insert a description of any mechanism M . This is a well-defined valuation for any M ; however, a contradiction is obtained by studying what happens when a specific mechanism M is run on the valuation v M corresponding to the same mechanism (the "diagonal" of possible mechanism/valuation pairs).
We also have to specify succinctly the special profit-maximizing bundle so that finding it is computationally hard. We do that in two steps. First, we choose some random projection of the structured submenu to a hypercube {0, 1} , where = poly{n, m}. Next, we would like to specify some special strings in {0, 1} such that bundles in the structured menu that are projected to the special strings will be the profit-maximizing bundles. Of course, if we just specify the special strings in a straightforward way, it might be easy for an algorithm to efficiently find the profit-maximizing bundle. Therefore, we specify the special strings to be the satisfying assignments of a SAT instance. This completes our reduction.
To summarize, given a structured submenu that bidder i faces, we construct a valuation v i based on this structured submenu; we use a description of the mechanism itself to do so. The profit-maximizing bundles of v i will be exactly all bundles that are (randomly) projected to a satisfying assignment of the formula. We will show that with inverse-polynomial probability, the construction of the random valuations succeeds and the random projection indeed maps a bundle in the menu to a satisfying assignment; in this case, a truthful algorithm must find a solution to the SAT instance. This will show that the existence of a truthful mechanism as in the theorem implies N P = RP.
3.6.1. The Bidding Language. We start the proof by specifying the bidding language that we use, i.e., the class of valuations and their representation on the input. We use additive and polar additive valuations, as defined earlier, using their natural representation. In addition, the bidding language is able to express the following bonus valuations. Each bonus valuation is parameterized by four parameters: t, k, P(·), B(·), where t, k are nonnegative numbers, B : 2 M → {0, 1} is a Boolean function and P : 2 M → {0, 1} is a monotone Boolean function, both described by polynomial-size circuits. Hence, the complete representation (t, k, P, B) of a bonus valuations takes polynomial space. Given these parameters, the following valuation v is a bonus valuation:
if |S| > k and P(S) = 1.
Notice that computing the value v(S) for a given bundle S (i.e., implementing value queries) for bonus valuations can be done in polynomial time, given the representation earlier. In addition, similarly to Claim 3.14, it can be verified that v(S) is a monotone submodular function for any Boolean function B : 2 M → {0, 1} and monotone P :
The definition of the bonus function is similar but not identical to the one used in the optimization lemma for value oracles. The specific functions P(·) and B(·) that we choose later will roughly correspond to the construction in the value oracle case: for sets of size k, the function P(S) describes the "structured menu" by giving value 1 to bundles in the structured menu and 0 otherwise. It also specifies the bundles that are larger and more expensive than the bundles in the structured menu by giving value 1 to them. Among the bundles in the structured menu, the function B(·) picks the bonus bundles by giving value 1.
3.6.2. The Reduction. Our goal is to solve a SAT instance using the presumed truthful mechanism. In the reduction, we need to find the parameters k and p of the structured menu in polynomial time. We do that as follows. . . , m, we notice that the number of possible combinations of values for p and k is polynomially bounded. Therefore, we can try each combination one by one.
Next, we set up a bonus valuation for bidder i that will allow us to embed the SAT problem in it. We choose the parameter t to be equal to t = 2 2m . The parameters k and p of the bonus valuation are identical to the parameters k and p of the structured submenu. The following lemma describes the function P p (·) that we use as the P(·) parameter of the bonus valuation. PROOF. Let us verify that P p (·) is a monotone function. Let S ⊂ T . If P p (S) = 1, then one possibility is that S is a candidate and thus by definition of a structured menu,
by the monotonicity of the prices p S . In both cases, P p (T ) = 1.
To evaluate P p (S), we show that we can efficiently decide whether S is a candidate and whether p S (v −i ) > p or not, using the truthful mechanism as a black box. Given a bundle S, consider the following additive valuation v for bidder i: v({ j}) = 2 p if j ∈ S and v({ j}) = 0 otherwise. Let S be the bundle allocated to i in A(v, v −i ), and let p be the price that i is charged in this instance.
First, assume that |S| = k; here, we want to determine whether S is a candidate. We start with showing that if S is a candidate, then the returned bundle under valuation v must be S = S. To see this, recall that if S is a candidate, then
No other set can have higher profit, because supersets of S have the same value and strictly higher price, whereas sets that do not contain S have value at most 2 p|S| − 2 p. Thus, S = S, and we also learn the price 
In this case, we conclude that S is a candidate. If the preceding process fails at some point, S cannot be a candidate.
Next, we consider the case where |S| > k; here, we just need to check whether p S (v −i ) > p. If S = S, then we learn the price of S and can immediately check whether p S (v −i ) > p. Next, consider the case where there exists some item j ∈ S \ S . Then, we claim that
The last remaining case is that S ⊂ S . Then, we claim that
, then the profit from S is larger than the profit from S . But this cannot be, since S is allocated to i by the (truthful) mechanism. Therefore, we can again check whether
We now proceed to implementing the function B(·). The role of this function is to specify which candidate bundles get a bonus. A naive way to do so would be to explicitly list the bundles that get a bonus. However, this would make finding a profit-maximizing bundle too easy. Thus, we use an implicit way of specifying these bundles: all bundles that correspond to a satisfying assignment of a certain SAT instance. Specifically, given a Boolean formula φ on variables, we construct a circuit for the following function B(·). We generate a uniformly random matrix T ∈ {0, 1} . This is because T (S ) = T (S ∩ S ) ⊕ i∈S \S T i , where T i is the i-th column of T , uniformly distributed in {0, 1} and independent of T (S) for i / ∈ S. (We can assume without loss of generality that S \ S = ∅.) Therefore, even conditioning on T (S) = x, the probability that T (S ) = x is still 2 − . In other words, the variables Z S are pairwise independent, and we can compute Finally, we prove that if φ is satisfiable and all random choices are successful in the sense that the structured submenu S(v −i , k, p) is sufficiently large and the random transformation T hits the satisfying assignment, then the mechanism must return a bundle S such that B(S ) = 1. Now we can summarize and finish the proof of Theorem 3.2. Let > 0 be any positive constant. We assume that there is a truthful mechanism A for combinatorial auctions with n submodular bidders and m items that achieves a n 12 -approximation when n = 10m 1/2− . By Lemma 3.10, we know that with probability 1 n , a deterministic mechanism A sampled from the support of A provides an n 10 -approximation on a random polar additive instance with probability at least 1 n . In the following, we work with such a mechanism A .
Our goal is to solve a SAT problem in which we are given a formula φ with variables.
We choose parameters n = 10m 1/2− = poly( ) so that e m/n 2 10n 2 ·m 6 > 2 2 , and we produce an instance of combinatorial auctions with n bidders and m items. We set t = 2 2m
. We generate a random polar additive instance for which with polynomially high probability, there is a bidder i that faces a menu in A of size |S| ≥ e m/n 2 10n 2 ·m 6 . Then, we try all possible values of k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} and p ∈ { 1 m 5 , 2 m 5 , . . . , m}, and we construct a bonus valuation for bidder i with these parameters. We construct a circuit implementing the function P(·) by simulating the computation of the presumed mechanism, according to Lemma 3.20. We also pick a random matrix T ∈ {0, 1} ×m and construct a circuit implementing the function B(·) such that B(S) = 1 if and only if T (S) satisfies φ. Then, we run the mechanism on the bonus valuation defined by (t, k, P, B) for bidder i and v −i for the remaining bidders.
If the mechanism returns a bundle S for bidder i such that B(S) = 1, we have found a satisfying assignment T (S) to the formula φ. If not, we repeat this process polynomially many times. If the process fails in all runs, we answer that the formula is unsatisfiable; otherwise, we have found a satisfying assignment. This procedure fails only if the formula is satisfiable, with exponentially small probability.
